Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for Derivatives to Combat Systemic Risk by Faubus, Bryan G.
FAUBUS IN FINAL 12/15/2009 11:44:03 AM 
 
 
Note 
NARROWING THE BANKRUPTCY SAFE 
HARBOR FOR DERIVATIVES TO COMBAT 
SYSTEMIC RISK 
BRYAN G. FAUBUSF† 
ABSTRACT 
  Bankruptcy law establishes proceedings designed to rehabilitate 
debtors while protecting creditors, but a series of safe harbors 
effectively exempts from bankruptcy proceedings certain financial 
contracts known as derivatives. Accordingly, when a party to a 
derivative contract goes bankrupt, the counterparty may terminate the 
contract and seize what it is owed from the debtor’s assets. Congress 
enacted these safe harbors to combat the risk of systemic failure by 
maintaining liquidity in troubled markets; in doing so, however, they 
allowed counterparties to engage in opportunistic behavior and 
inefficiently consume a debtor’s limited assets. Because these two 
consequences may harm the debtor and its creditors, the safe harbors 
may merely substitute one kind of systemic risk for another. 
  This Note argues that these safe harbors might more effectively 
combat systemic risk if they did not permit counterparties to terminate 
derivatives that are more valuable to the debtor. This is likely true of 
an insurance-like derivative known as the credit default swap (CDS). 
Just as insurance contracts may not be terminated—because 
maintaining insurance is crucial both to debtor rehabilitation and 
creditor protection—certain CDSs should not be eligible for 
termination under the safe harbors. Narrowing the safe harbors might 
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help eliminate unnecessary costs arising from bankruptcy and thereby 
better reduce systemic risk.  
INTRODUCTION 
Two thousand and eight was “the year the financial system 
stopped working.”F1F The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the federal 
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the near failure and 
subsequent bailout of Bear Stearns and American International 
Group (AIG) triggered huge losses on Wall Street and across the 
country,F2F signaling even to lay observers that the subprime mortgage 
crisis had metastasized into a serious threat to the American 
economy.F3F These failures were largely symptomatic of the steep 
decline in value of securities backed by subprime mortgages,F4F but 
only a portion of the blame lies in the collapse of the subprime 
market. In large part, “the [financial] system was vulnerable because 
of intricate financial contracts known as credit derivatives.”F5F In light 
of the role these largely unregulated contracts played in the financial 
crisis, state regulators and industry insiders have begun working on 
reform initiatives to make credit derivatives safer.F6F These initiatives, 
however, can only address part of the problem.F7F Credit derivatives 
 
 1. Floyd Norris, A Year of Chaos in Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B1. 
 2. See id. (cataloging the assorted failures and bailouts of different institutions in 2008). 
 3. See Economists Call Subprime Fallout Biggest Threat, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 3, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23436696/ (“The cascading fallout from the subprime loan crisis, 
barely a cloud on the horizon a year ago, is now viewed by experts as the economy’s gravest 
threat.”). 
 4. See Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, A Wall St. Domino Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 
2008, at A1 (linking the subprime mortgage crisis to the failure of Bear Stearns and the huge 
losses suffered by other investment banks, including Lehman Brothers); Serena Ng, Swaps 
Market Is Pressed to Ease Market Strains, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at C2 (tying the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy to the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 5. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer’s Crisis, a Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A1. 
 6. See Danny Hakim, New York to Regulate a Financial Tool Behind the Credit Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C10 (announcing that New York’s insurance department would 
begin regulating CDSs as “insurance products” in certain cases); Aline van Duyn, Worries 
Remain Even After CDS Clean-Up, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
af1efb78-0dc6-11de-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html (“Since [the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers], the 
industry has pushed through 10 years worth of changes in just a few months.” (quoting 
Athanassios Diplas, Managing Director, Deutsche Bank)). 
 7. State-level initiatives cannot fully address, for example, how derivatives are treated in 
bankruptcy proceedings because the Constitution provides that Congress has the power “to 
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
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pose a danger to the financial system in part because they are subject 
to a series of safe harbors in the Bankruptcy Code that exempts credit 
derivatives from bankruptcy safeguards designed to help financially 
distressed firms recover while protecting their creditors.F8F This Note 
argues that narrowing the scope of these safe harbors may reduce the 
potential of credit derivatives to harm the financial system. 
One of the primary causes of the market turmoil in 2008 was a 
species of credit derivative known as the credit default swap (CDS).F9F 
Generally, a CDS is a private contract in which a seller guarantees a 
purchaser (both of these parties are referred to as “counterparties”) a 
fixed payment if a predefined credit event occurs (typically a credit 
downgrade, bond default, or bankruptcy).F10F Many in the financial 
services industry viewed CDSs, which have historically been subject 
to little regulation,F11F as unparalleled engines of profit.F12 
For example, AIG made enormous profits selling CDSs as a kind 
of insurance against losses on mortgage-backed securities,F13F but, as 
the subprime mortgage crisis developed, the value of the underlying 
 
 8. See, e.g., In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Chapter 11 
[bankruptcy] is intended to permit the debtor to rehabilitate itself while simultaneously 
protecting creditors.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Anderson & Bajaj, supra note 4 (“Of particular concern are the insurance 
contracts known as credit default swaps . . . . Investors in such contracts with [distressed firms] 
are closely studying whether they can get out of them or have them transferred to a more stable 
firm.”); Shannon D. Harrington, Credit Swap Clearinghouse to Be Running by Year-End, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&sid= 
ahqxOSMiB2bI (“[T]he virtually unregulated . . . market in credit-default swaps has played a 
significant role in the credit crisis.” (quoting Christopher Cox, former Chairman, SEC)); Liam 
Pleven & Susanne Craig, Congress Grills Former AIG Chiefs: Lawmakers Ask Whether 
Executives Glossed over Warnings About Risks Insurer Faced, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at A3 
(“[D]erivatives . . . were largely responsible for three consecutive multibillion-dollar quarterly 
losses AIG reported in the months before the government agreed to loan the company as much 
as $85 billion.”). 
 10. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2007). 
 11. See Harrington, supra note 9 (quoting former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox 
describing the CDS market as “virtually unregulated”). For a discussion of the regulation (or 
lack thereof) of CDSs, see infra Part III.A. 
 12. See Morgenson, supra note 5. Joseph Cassano, former head of AIG’s Financial 
Products division (AIGFP), stated in August 2007 that “[i]t is hard for us, without being 
flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing one 
dollar in any of those [CDS] transactions.” Id. 
 13. Id. Between 1999 and 2005, revenue from AIGFP rose from $737 million to $3.26 
billion. These profits were primarily derived from selling CDSs on “packages of debt known as 
‘collateralized debt obligations.’ . . . [which essentially] were pools of loans sliced into tranches 
and sold to investors based on the credit quality of the underlying securities.” Id. 
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securities plummeted.F14F Concurrently, AIG’s CDS liabilities 
mounted.F15F These unexpected losses destabilized AIG,F16F sending a 
shockwave through AIG’s trading partners, which consisted of a 
“‘global swath’ of top-notch entities including ‘banks and investment 
banks, pension funds, endowments, foundations, insurance 
companies, hedge funds, money managers, high-net-worth 
individuals, municipalities and sovereigns and supranationals.’”F17F In 
light of the importance of AIG’s stable of trading partners, the firm’s 
possible failure threatened indeterminate losses to the larger financial 
system. 
The risk that AIG’s failure could cause a chain of consequences 
negatively affecting both market participants and the larger economy 
is an example of “systemic risk.”F18F Systemic risk concerns prompted 
the Federal Reserve to bail out AIG to prevent the likely 
repercussions of the faltering company’s failure.F19F If AIG had failed, 
its web of trading partners would have suffered direct losses resulting 
from AIG’s inability to meet its obligations.F20F More importantly (for 
 
 14. See AIG, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Feb. 27, 2008) (“AIG insurance and 
financial services subsidiaries invest in mortgage-backed securities and CDOs, in which the 
underlying collateral is composed in whole or in part of residential mortgage loans; and AIGFP 
provides credit protection through credit default swaps . . . .”); see also First Amended 
Complaint at 1, In re AIG, Inc., 2007 Derivative Litig., No. 07-CV-10464 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 
2009) (“[AIG’s officers and directors] steered AIG into writing insurance on complex debt 
instruments (based on mortgages) in such a way that the Company would experience 
catastrophic losses if such mortgages began to default—as, indeed, occurred.”). 
 15. See Marine Cole, AIG’s Losses Show Swaps Next Domino, FIN. WK., Feb. 18, 
2008, available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080218/REG/ 
794188688 (noting that AIG underwrote over $500 billion in CDSs, with close to $78 billion of 
that sum allotted to securitized transactions with value derived from mortgage-backed 
securities). 
 16. In 2007, to reflect the changing values of its assets, AIGFP wrote down its CDS 
portfolio by $11.2 billion. AIG, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 28 (Feb. 27, 2008). In the 
first nine months of 2008, it wrote down the same portfolio by an additional $21.7 billion. AIG, 
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Nov. 10, 2008). These write-downs helped trigger a 
“liquidity crisis” at AIG and ultimately necessitated its bailout by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York on September 16, 2008. Id. at 50. 
 17. Morgenson, supra note 5 (quoting Joseph Cassano, former head, AIGFP). 
 18. See Editorial, Free AIG, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at A18 (stating that the Federal 
Reserve “justified its intervention on systemic risk grounds”). 
 19. See, e.g., Pleven & Craig, supra note 9 (explaining the events leading up to the federal 
bailout of AIG); Editorial, Closing the Gaps, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2009, at A12 (“[T]he Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury had to step in, lest its giant web of credit-default swaps collapse and 
bring the world economy down with it.”). 
 20. See Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Chief Owns Significant Stake in Goldman, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at B1 (“Had A.I.G. simply declared bankruptcy, the financial institutions 
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the purposes of this Note), AIG’s failure also could have triggered a 
run on the company’s assets by, among others, its CDS 
counterparties.F21F These counterparties could have immediately 
terminated their contracts with AIG and fulfilled their claims by 
seizing collateral from AIG’s assets, further destabilizing the 
company and leaving slower creditors “stuck with a company whose 
value took a tremendous dive after counterparties got first dibs on its 
carcass.”F22 
CDS counterparties are able to terminate their contracts and 
seize collateral because a series of safe harbor provisions in the 
Bankruptcy Code (collectively known as the “Safe Harbor”) allow 
them to sidestep normal bankruptcy proceedings.F23F According to the 
legislative history of these provisions, Congress crafted the Safe 
Harbor to reduce systemic risk.F24F In theory, the Safe Harbor works to 
reduce the potentially widespread consequences of a default by 
maintaining liquidity in troubled markets. Without the Safe Harbor, a 
bankruptcy filing would effectively freeze the contractual 
relationship, leaving the counterparties exposed to market 
movements affecting the value of the contract.F25F Because the Safe 
 
doing business with it would have ended up in court . . . fighting to get pennies on the dollar for 
their claims.”). 
 21. Marie Beaudette, Bankruptcy for AIG? Think Again, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2009/03/18/bankruptcy-for-aig-think-again/. For many readers, 
the word “run” (in this context) will conjure up the bank run scene in Frank Capra’s 1946 classic 
It’s a Wonderful Life. The same mechanics are at play when creditors run on a debtor’s assets: a 
run is merely a scenario in which competing creditors race to successfully enforce claims against 
a party possessing resources insufficient to satisfy all claims. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006) (outlining the nondebtor derivative counterparty's right to 
terminate contracts and seize collateral); id. §§ 555–56, 559–61 (specifying that counterparties 
may exercise existing contractual rights, including ipso facto clauses, in different varieties of 
derivative agreements). For a discussion of the Safe Harbor, see infra Part III.B.2. 
 24. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 3, 20, 131–32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
89, 105–06, 191–92 (justifying the 2005 amendments as “provisions designed to reduce systemic 
risk”); cf. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND 
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 40 (1999) (“The ability to terminate 
financial contracts upon a counterparty's insolvency enhances market stability. Such close-out 
netting limits losses to solvent counterparties and reduces systemic risk. It permits the solvent 
parties to replace terminated contracts without incurring additional market risk and thereby 
preserves liquidity.”). 
 25. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84 
(“The prompt closing out or liquidation of [derivatives] freezes the status quo and minimizes the 
potentially massive losses and chain reactions that could occur if the market were to move 
sharply in the wrong direction.”); cf. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 
24, at 26 (“[The Safe Harbor provisions] serve to reduce the likelihood that the procedure for 
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Harbor frees CDS counterparties to claim the debtor’s assets upon 
filing for bankruptcy,F26F however, there is a risk that a run on the 
debtor will lead to a liquidity shortage “that has the potential to spill 
over to other firms and markets and cause widespread instability in 
financial markets.”F27F Put simply, the Safe Harbor may merely 
substitute one kind of systemic risk for another. 
This Note argues that the Safe Harbor would more effectively 
reduce systemic risk if it did not exempt all CDSs from bankruptcy 
proceedings. The Safe Harbor’s blanket exemption presupposes that 
the benefits of increased market liquidity when CDS counterparties 
liquidate their contracts and seize collateral will outweigh the costs of 
an unrestrained run on the debtor’s assets. That is true when CDSs 
are practically fungible,F28F but not all CDSs hold the same value for 
both the debtor and creditor. 
This Note posits that when CDSs are analogous to insurance 
contracts, they likely have more value in the hands of the debtor than 
in the hands of a counterparty. The argument is as follows: Insurance-
like CDSs protect the debtor firm against a certain risk. Removing 
this protection subjects the debtor to greater risk, further devaluing 
the firm.F29F If the decrease in the debtor firm’s value exceeds the value 
created by liquidation of the CDS, the liquidation results in a net 
loss.F30F If these kinds of liquidations are widespread or the debtor firm 
is sufficiently large, the operation of the Safe Harbor may have 
negative systemic consequences.F31F Thus, modifying the Safe Harbor to 
 
resolving a single insolvency will trigger other insolvencies due to the creditors’ inability to 
control their market risk.”). 
 26. For a discussion of the dangers posed by a “run” on the debtor’s assets, see infra Part 
IV.A.1. 
 27. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: 
Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 105–06 (2005). 
 28. See id. at 95 (arguing that derivatives “are fungible assets and can be seized by creditors 
without” undue negative consequences). 
 29. See id. at 115 (“[I]ncreased exposure to . . . risk can harm the firm’s operations and its 
other creditors.”). 
 30. The values at play here can be conceptualized as follows: the decrease in the debtor’s 
value caused by the counterparty’s termination of contracts and seizure of collateral can be 
thought of as the difference between the firm’s liquidation value and the firm’s going-concern 
value, plus the situation-specific losses arising from the termination of the debtor’s hedges. See 
infra Part IV.B. Weighing against these losses is the liquidity value that a counterparty gains 
when it terminates a contract with the debtor and is no longer locked into the contract 
(rendering the counterparty safe from market fluctuations that would affect the contract’s 
value). Additionally, the aggregate effect of these individual settlements is to ease market-wide 
uncertainty as to the exposure of market participants to the debtor. See infra Part IV.C. 
 31. See infra notes 174–75, 183–89 and accompanying text. 
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subject insurance-like CDSs to normal bankruptcy proceedings might, 
on the whole, reduce the possibility that a firm entering bankruptcy 
will pose a systemic threat. 
This argument depends upon an understanding of how CDSs 
raise systemic risk problems in the context of bankruptcy 
proceedings. As such, this Note begins by discussing in Part I the most 
salient features of CDSs and derivatives (the family of financial 
instruments to which they belong). Part II explains the conceptual 
underpinnings of systemic risk. Part III concludes the background 
discussion with a closer look at the regulation of derivatives and their 
treatment under the Bankruptcy Code. 
The remainder of the Note identifies some crucial problems with 
the Safe Harbor and proposes a reform. Part IV evaluates how the 
Safe Harbor interacts with the dynamics of systemic risk by 
examining two case studies: the collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management, a hedge fund, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
a financial services firm. Finally, Part V outlines a reform that may 
make the Safe Harbor a better tool for reducing systemic risk. 
Without empirical evidence, it is impossible to know whether this 
Note’s proposed reform would provide greater benefits than the 
current blanket exemption; this Note simply seeks to outline the 
dynamics at play in order to guide future inquiries into the matter. 
I.  DERIVATIVES, CREDIT DERIVATIVES, 
AND CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
Understanding how derivatives pose a danger to the financial 
system requires understanding how these financial instruments are 
used and why they are unique. The term “derivatives” generically 
refers to a family of financial instruments linked together by certain 
common traits. A basic understanding of these traits will help 
illuminate the particular species of derivative that is the focus of this 
Note—the CDS. Accordingly, this Part begins with a brief primer on 
derivatives, before the discussion narrows to focus on credit 
derivatives and the mechanics and uses of the CDS.F32F This Part closes 
with a brief look at how the widespread use of CDSs has changed the 
way that the financial markets function, for better and for worse. 
 
 32. FRANK J. FABOZZI, HENRY A. DAVIS & MOORAD CHOUDHRY, INTRODUCTION TO 
STRUCTURED FINANCE 45 (2006). 
FAUBUS IN FINAL 12/15/2009  11:44:03 AM 
808 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:801 
A.  Derivatives Generally 
A derivative is a bilateral financial contract contemplating that 
“either or both of two parties (each referred to as a ‘counterparty’) 
agrees to make payments or deliveries to the other based on the 
performance or change in the value” of an external instrument, rate, 
or event (the “reference subject”).F33F The reference subject is limited 
only by the imaginations of the contracting parties: “anything that can 
be quantified and objectively verified can be the subject of a 
derivative.”F34F For example, the most common types of derivative 
securities are “financial contracts that ‘derive’ their value from cash 
market instruments such as stocks, bonds, currencies and 
commodities.”F35F Derivative instruments commonly reference interest 
rates, currency exchange rates, or physical commodities,F36F but a 
derivative may also reference such unusual subjects as weather 
conditions and mortality rates.F37 
The payout value of a derivative is derived from the change in 
value of the reference subject.F38F The most salient characteristic of a 
derivative is that its value is a function of the reference subject’s 
value. The relationship between the two values does not necessarily 
correlate in a linear fashion; rather, it is defined by the terms of the 
 
 33. Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as Collateral, 
57 BUS. LAW. 1127, 1128 (2002). 
 34. Id. at 1129. 
 35. SALIH N. NEFTCI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES 2 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Joseph S. Rizello, The Development and Evolution of 
Derivative Products, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES & SYNTHETICS: INNOVATIONS, 
TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL MARKETS 1, 2 (Robert A. Klein & Jess 
Lederman eds., 1994)). 
 36. See Guinn & Harvey, supra note 33, at 1128–29 (describing typical reference subjects). 
 37. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange offers weather derivatives that derive their value 
from average temperature fluctuation around a predetermined average temperature. See 
GEOFFREY CONSIDINE, AQUILA ENERGY, INTRODUCTION TO WEATHER DERIVATIVES 
(1999), http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather/files/WEA_intro_to_weather_der.pdf 
(presenting a broad overview of weather derivatives). For a discussion of mortality derivatives, 
which are designed to allow pension funds to hedge against the costs incurred when pensioners 
live longer than expected, see GUY COUGHLAN ET AL., JPMORGAN, Q-FORWARDS: 
DERIVATIVES FOR TRANSFERRING MORTALITY AND LONGEVITY RISK 1 (2007), 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM/DirectDoc&urlname=LM_Q_forwards.pdf. 
 38. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FAQs: Financial Markets, http://www.treas.gov/ 
education/faq/markets/derivatives.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (“A derivative is a financial 
instrument whose price is derived from the value of one or more underlying assets, liabilities, or 
indices.”). 
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contract.F39F By tying a set payout or exchange to changes in the state of 
a reference subject, derivatives allow firms to plan for future risks. 
Therefore, derivatives serve as “the basic building blocks of all more 
complicated risk management positions.”F40 
Derivatives have transformed finance over the last thirty years 
by “fostering more precise ways of understanding, quantifying, and 
managing risk.”F41F In discussing risk management, former Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan explained that, because 
derivatives “permit[] the unbundling of financial risks . . . . individual 
financial instruments now can be analyzed in terms of their common 
underlying risk factors, and risks can be managed on a portfolio 
basis.”F42F A well-designed derivatives transaction can isolate and shift 
onto a willing derivative seller almost any imaginable risk. As the 
financial services industry has recognized the versatility and 
usefulness of these instruments, the derivatives market has grown 
exponentially.F43F Firms use derivatives not only to hedge against a wide 
variety of risks, including fluctuations in interest and exchange rates,F44F 
but also as speculative investments and for arbitrage.F45 
 
 39. The customizability of derivative agreements contributes to their versatility, which is 
desirable, and their complexity, which is not. In some cases, complexity can obscure the ultimate 
value of an instrument, which may lead to nasty surprises. For a cogent and entertaining account 
of how complexity can wreak havoc in financial markets, see generally RICHARD BOOKSTABER, 
A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL 
INNOVATION (2007). 
 40. ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, at vii (3d ed. 
2003). 
 41. Letter from Lawrence H. Summers, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury, et al., to Al Gore, 
President of the Senate, U.S. Senate (Nov. 9, 1999), in PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. 
MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE 
ACT 5, 5 (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf. 
 42. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure (May 5, 2005), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm. 
 43. A 2003 survey found that 92 percent of the world’s five hundred largest companies use 
derivatives to hedge risk. Press Release, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, Over 90% of the 
World's 500 Largest Companies Use Derivatives to Help Manage Their Risks, According to 
New ISDA Survey (Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.isda.org/statistics/surveynewsrelease 
030903v2.html. 
 44. See Guinn & Harvey, supra note 33, at 1130–32 (describing various kinds of derivatives 
transactions). 
 45. John T. Lynch, Comment, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for 
Direct Regulatory Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 
1371, 1373 (2008). According to another source, “derivatives are unsurpassed as tools for 
speculation.” KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 40, at vii. 
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Regardless of the instrument’s purpose, derivatives generally fall 
into two broad categories: exchange-traded and over-the-counter 
(OTC).F46F This Note focuses on the largely unregulated OTC market,F47F 
which consists of parties directly entering into private contracts 
without using a clearinghouse intermediary.F48F In the OTC market, the 
counterparties can negotiate the details of the contract directly and 
enter into transactions tailored to their unique needs. Consequently, 
there is a great amount of innovation and variation among OTC 
transactions. Nevertheless, the OTC derivative market can be roughly 
divided into five groups: “foreign currency exchange contracts, 
interest rate contracts, equity-linked contracts, commodity contracts, 
and credit derivatives.”F49F Since the early 1990s, the credit derivative 
market in particular has experienced explosive growth.F50 
B.  Credit Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps 
Credit derivatives are generally defined as “financial instruments 
whose payoffs are linked in some way to a change in credit quality of 
an issuer or issuers.”F51F A “change in credit quality” can be as 
straightforward as a downgrade in credit rating or as dramatic as 
bankruptcy.F52F Credit quality reflects credit risk,F53F which is generally 
 
 46. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1375. 
 47. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1036 (“Because swaps are structured as over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives, they are largely unregulated. Among other things, this means 
that the details of particular swaps often go undisclosed.”). 
 48. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1375. In contrast to OTC instruments, exchange-traded 
instruments are “traded on an organized financial exchange.” KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 
40, at 4. In this market, the counterparties enter into standardized contracts with an exchange 
clearinghouse (such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade), 
Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1996), and the clearinghouse acts as the counterparty both to the buyer and the 
seller, id. at 16. 
 49. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1376. 
 50. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1021 (“[T]he market for credit derivatives has 
grown from virtually nothing a decade ago to the range of $20 trillion of notional value in 
2006.”). 
 51. Id. at 1019. 
 52. See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 13 (2004) 
(listing as typical credit events defaults on bond payments, credit rating downgrades, 
restructuring, and bankruptcy). 
 53. “Credit risk is the oldest form of risk in the financial markets.” JOHN B. CAOUETTE, 
EDWARD I. ALTMAN & PAUL NARAYANAN, MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE NEXT GREAT 
FINANCIAL CHALLENGE 1 (1998). 
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thought of as the probability of default on an outstanding obligation.F54F 
Thus, credit derivatives allow parties to reduce the credit risk of an 
investment or transaction by shifting some or all of the risk onto a 
derivative seller.F55 
The most common type of credit derivative is the CDS,F56F a 
private contract that transfers credit risk from a credit protection 
buyer to a protection seller.F57F A protection buyer can use a CDS to 
unbundle and hedge the credit risks associated with a particular 
entity, a group of entities, or even an entire industry.F58F By using a 
CDS in combination with other derivatives, a protection buyer may 
customize a transaction or business relationship such that it has 
“almost any desired risk profile.”F59 
In a CDS transaction, the protection buyer makes either fixed 
periodic payments or a single up-front payment to the protection 
sellerF60F and, in return, the protection seller is obligated to make a 
payment or swap upon the occurrence of a predefined credit event.F61F 
 
 54. See Société Générale, Credit Risk, http://www.equityderivatives.com/what-the-experts-
say/glossary/credit-risk/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (defining credit risk as “the risk that a loss 
will be incurred if a counterparty to a (derivatives) transaction does not fulfill its financial 
obligations in a timely manner”); see also Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. 
Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing a particular type of credit risk 
known as “country risk”). 
 55. See Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 171 (“Banks, investment funds and 
other institutions increasingly use financial contracts known as ‘credit derivatives’ to mitigate 
credit risk.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 171–72 (defining a CDS as “[a] contract which transfers credit risk from a 
protection buyer to a credit protection seller” (alteration in original) (quoting OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT: FOURTH QUARTER 
2003, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/deriv/dq403.pdf)). 
 58. Bruce Kayle, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Credit Derivative Transactions, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 221, 225 (Jack Clark Francis, Joyce A. Frost & J. 
Gregg Whittaker eds., 1999)) (“A [CDS] can be written with respect to a single obligation, but 
frequently will provide for a payment based on the default of any one or more obligations in an 
identified portfolio of reference obligations.”). The reference subject may be a debt or equity 
asset (or group of assets) or an entity (or group of entities). CHOUDHRY, supra note 52, at 16–
19. If the reference subject is an asset, the CDS would be concerned with the credit quality of 
bonds or other securities. If the reference subject is an entity, the CDS would be concerned with 
the credit of “[a] corporate or sovereign name.” Id. at 14 n.8. 
 59. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1024. For example, “[i]f the lender wishes to bear a 
borrower’s firm specific default risk, but not risk related to the industry as a whole . . . the 
lender could purchase derivatives that would compensate the lender in the event of an industry 
downturn (such as a derivative linked to the stock prices of a broad group of companies in the 
industry).” Id. 
 60. Kayle, supra note 58, at 224. 
 61. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 172. 
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The payment or swap takes place according to the terms articulated 
in the contract: generally, the protection seller is obligated to pay the 
buyer using a predefined settlement mechanism.F62F The settlement 
mechanism may call for either “cash settlement . . . or physical 
delivery of the reference asset, in exchange for a cash payment equal 
to the initial notional [i.e., face] amount [of the CDS contract].”F63F 
Typically, the protection seller’s payout equals “the difference 
between the reference obligation’s original principal amount or fair 
market value at the time the [CDS] is entered into and post-[credit 
event] market value of the reference obligation,” but the 
counterparties are free to specify any desired variety of payout in the 
CDS contract.F64F In essence, CDS counterparties wager on the 
occurrence of a credit event, typically a “bankruptcy, default, or 
restructuring,”F65F and the CDS buyer transfers to the seller the risk 
that the credit event will occur. 
CDSs are used primarily for hedgingF66F or “trading to reduce risk” 
by taking a position in one investment to offset the risk of another 
investment position.F67F A hedging strategy sacrifices some of the 
potential return on the initial investment in exchange for limiting the 
risk posed by the initial investment.F68F Thus, a hedge will not increase 
the return of an investment (it will, in fact, decrease the return), but it 
does make a desired outcome more certain.F69F A typical CDS 
transaction illustrates this principle: a bank might hedge the credit 
risk associated with a major loan by buying a CDS from a third party 
with payout triggered by the borrower’s credit event. If the borrower 
defaults on the loan, “the bank will lose money on the loan but make 
money on the [CDS]; conversely, if the [borrower] does not default, 
the bank will make a payment to the [protection seller], reducing its 
profits on the loan.”F70 
 
 62. Id. at 172. 
 63. Id. at 173 (alterations in original) (quoting Joyce A. Frost, Credit Risk Management 
from a Corporate Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES, supra note 58, at 
87, 90). 
 64. Kayle, supra note 58, at 224–25. 
 65. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1019. 
 66. See id. at 1023 (“[H]edging benefits[] [are] the most familiar virtue of credit default 
swaps.”). 
 67. Romano, supra note 48, at 9. 
 68. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1374. 
 69. Romano, supra note 48, at 9. 
 70. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1019. 
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As illustrated by the example above, a CDS used to hedge credit 
risks is much like an ordinary insurance contract.F71F Hedging CDSs are 
often used as “insurance policies for holders of corporate bonds or 
other securities against downgrades in the credit of the issuing 
companies.”F72F As with an insurance policy, the protection buyer pays 
either an upfront or periodic fee, “like an insurance premium,”F73F to 
the protection seller in exchange for “a contingent payment if a 
predefined credit event occurs.”F74F The similarity between hedging 
CDSs and insurance contracts plays a central role in this Note’s 
argument regarding how CDSs should be regulated.F75 
CDSs are also useful tools in arbitrage and speculative 
investment.F76F A speculative CDS investment (referred to as a “naked” 
CDS) is essentially a bet on the occurrence of a specified credit 
event.F77F This is true because an investor may purchase a CDS 
referencing specific risks or market segments “without having to 
purchase outright the instruments or assets that make up that 
market.”F78F This distinguishes naked CDSs from insurance-like 
hedging CDSs: when the specified credit event occurs in a naked CDS 
transaction, the protection buyer will receive payment without regard 
 
 71. Merrill Lynch Int’l v. XL Capital Assurance Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); see also CHOUDHRY, supra note 52, at 1 (noting that a CDS is “conceptually similar to an 
insurance policy taken out against the default of a bond”); Kayle, supra note 58, at 224–25 
(stating that a CDS “functions as a form of insurance against the risk of default” when the 
protection buyer is exposed to the reference subject); cf. Ng, supra note 4 (describing CDSs as 
“insurance against a Lehman default”). For a more detailed discussion of the similarities 
between insurance contracts and CDSs, see infra notes 213–20 and accompanying text. 
 72. Deutsche Bank AG v. AMBAC Credit Prods., LLC, No. 04 Civ. 5594 (DLC), 2006 WL 
1867497, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006). 
 73. Merrill Lynch Int’l, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 300. 
 74. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 172 
(2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Frost, supra note 63, at 90). 
 75. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 76. See Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 172 (characterizing the protection 
seller’s use of credit derivatives as a strategy to “earn income and diversify their own investment 
portfolios” (footnote omitted)). 
 77. See Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default Swaps 
Bring Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, BUS. L. BRIEF, Fall 2008, at 15, 21 n.9 (citing Terry 
Kivlan, Senate Agricultural Panel Reviews Credit Default Swaps, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 14, 
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 19567728)). 
 78. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1374. 
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to whether they suffered an actual loss (that is, without an “insurable 
interest”F79F). 
C.  CDSs and the Financial System 
The ubiquitous use of CDSs by banks and other market 
participants to hedge credit risk has changed the way that the credit 
markets function and, according to some, has resulted in “system-
wide benefits.”F80F Alan Greenspan argued that the widespread use of 
CDSs mitigated the potentially devastating repercussions of the 
“largest corporate defaults in history (WorldCom and Enron) and the 
largest sovereign default in history (Argentina).”F81F Many of the firms 
that were exposed to risk posed by the defaults of these entities had 
hedged that risk by purchasing CDSs.F82F This use of CDSs to insure 
against credit risk—if widespread—may contribute to a more resilient 
economy that is less susceptible to system-wide shocks resulting from 
the failure of a major market participant.F83 
The widespread use of CDSs, however, also has the potential to 
harm the economy. Putting aside issues relating to the substance of 
individual contracts (for example, whether accurate information 
about the reference subject exists),F84F the increase in derivatives-based 
hedging strategies may contribute to systemic risk by increasing the 
“linkages among market participants.”F85F In their capacity to create 
 
 79. The phrase “insurable interest” is defined as “[a] legal interest in another person’s life 
or health or in the protection of property from injury, loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (8th ed. 2004). 
 80. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1024 (describing the benefits of CDSs if 
used widely by banks); id. at 1023–27 (discussing the beneficial consequences of credit 
derivatives on the credit markets); id. at 1032–40 (describing the detrimental consequences of 
credit derivatives). 
 81. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Corporate Governance, Remarks to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 2003 Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 
8, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/ 
default.htm. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1024 (citing the arguments of Alan 
Greenspan and others that “credit derivatives served as a shock absorber during the corporate 
crises of 2001 and 2002”). 
 84.  This was one of the problems underlying AIG’s collapse. See Morgenson, supra note 5 
(“Because the underlying debt securities . . . carried blue-chip ratings, [AIG] was happy to book 
income in exchange for [selling CDSs]. After all, [AIG’s executives] apparently assumed, they 
would never have to pay any claims.”). 
 85. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 221 (2008). 
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linkages, CDSs are analogous to vectorsF86F for systemic risk: “If an 
institution fails, it potentially would impact many more other 
institutions” through these linkages.F87F Thus, although CDSs 
strengthen financial markets by allowing market participants to 
transfer credit risk to those (hopefully) better able to handle it, they 
also tie market participants together in a fashion that makes it 
difficult to contain market shocks. The relationship between CDSs 
and systemic risk is explored in detail in Part II. 
II.  SYSTEMIC RISK 
Systemic risk is generally defined as the risk that a “trigger 
event” such as a market or institutional failure will cause a chain of 
consequences negatively affecting both market participants and the 
larger economy.F88F In the worst case scenario, the consequences of a 
systemic risk trigger event might encompass the failure of financial 
institutions or entire markets. Less severely, a trigger event could 
cause losses to financial institutions and volatility in financial markets. 
In any case, the consequences affect financial institutions, markets, or 
both.F89 
Systemic risk differs from normal market risk, which is common 
to an entire market and not unique to any individual market 
participant.F90F Market fluctuations relating to market risk are 
inevitable and even desirable; they “facilitate[] market equilibrium 
and curb[] excessive interest rates or periods of inflation.”F91F In 
contrast, systemic risk is the risk that market dynamics may cause an 
otherwise ordinary problem to spread, harming other market 
participants or, in the most dramatic scenario, causing an entire 
 
 86. In biology, a vector is defined as “[an] organism that transmits a pathogen[] . . . . [or] 
any agent that acts as a carrier or transporter.” RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY 2108 (2d ed. 2001). 
 87. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 221. 
 88. Id. at 198. 
 89. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1–2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 
583–84 (describing systemic risk as the risk that “the insolvency of one commodity or security 
firm [may] spread[] to other firms and possibl[y] threaten[] the collapse of the affected 
market”). 
 90. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 204 (“Although these downturns are sometimes 
conflated with systemic risk, they are more appropriately labeled systematic risk, meaning risk 
that cannot be diversified away and therefore affects most, if not all, market participants.”). 
 91. Id. 
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market or the entire financial system to collapse. It is noteworthy that 
even normal market fluctuations may trigger systemic problems.F92 
The best-known illustration of a systemic risk scenario is the 
1998 collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM). The Russian government defaulted on its bonds that year,F93F 
causing “LTCM to lose hundreds of millions of dollars and approach 
a default.”F94F Motivated by the fear of enormous losses to LTCM’s 
counterparties and the failure of multiple credit and interest rate 
markets,F95F “the Federal Reserve proactively stepped in to broker a 
settlement of LTCM’s debts.”F96F Notably, the systemic risk posed by 
LTCM’s near failure resulted from LTCM’s derivatives-based 
hedging strategy;F97F the derivatives used by LTCM provided the very 
linkages through which the repercussions of its default would have 
traveled.F98F An LTCM default presumably would have harmed 
counterparties to LTCM that were also linked to other institutions 
 
 92. Id. at 204 n.53 (citing Michael D. Bordo, Bruce Mizrach & Anna J. Schwartz, Real 
Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some Lessons from History 8–9 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5371, 1995), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=225434). 
 93. See Desmond Eppel, Note, Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 40 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 677 (2000) (“[T]he Russian government declared a debt 
moratorium and devalued the ruble on August 17, 1998 . . . .”). 
 94. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 201. 
 95. Id. at 201 (“Had Long-Term Capital . . . default[ed], its [derivatives] counterparties 
would have immediately ‘closed out’ their positions. If counterparties would have been able to 
close-out their positions at existing market prices, losses, if any, would have been minimal. 
However, if many firms had rushed to close-out hundreds of billions of dollars in transactions 
simultaneously, they would have been unable to liquidate collateral or establish offsetting 
positions at the previously-existing prices. Markets would have moved sharply and losses would 
have been exaggerated . . . . [Moreover, as a result of these market moves,] there was a 
likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would . . . possibly cease to function 
for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a 
loss of investor confidence, leading to a rush out of private credits, leading to further widening 
of credit spreads, leading to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” (third and fourth 
alterations in original) (quoting Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 18–19 (1998) (statement of William J. McDonough, 
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.), available at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/ 
speeches/1998/mcd981001.html). For further discussion of the dynamics of LTCM’s collapse, see 
infra notes 183–89. 
 96. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 201. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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and markets.F99F Thus, LTCM’s default would have “adversely affected 
many market participants with no [direct] connection to LTCM.”F100 
The specter of these widespread consequences makes systemic 
risk “the totem of choice for proponents of increased risk 
regulation.”F101F Ironically, “systemic failures are very rare events, 
indeed so rare that one has never been observed in modern 
economies.”F102F Perhaps because the threat of systemic failure is more 
theoretical than actual,F103F the question of how best to regulate 
systemic risk is hotly debated.F104F Before discussing approaches to 
regulating systemic risk, it is worth examining why regulation is an 
appropriate response to the problem. 
A.  Systemic Risk as a Tragedy of the Commons 
Regulation is appropriate to control systemic risk because, 
without regulation, individual market participants will take 
 
 99. Id. at 221 (“[D]iversifying risk through hedging increases linkages among market 
participants, which . . . could . . . foster systemic risk. If an institution fails, it potentially would 
impact many more other institutions.” (footnote omitted)). 
 100. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 100. 
 101. Eppel, supra note 93, at 689. Skepticism is warranted when systemic risk is invoked to 
prompt government action. Financial commentator Barry Ritholtz described systemic risk as the 
“buzzword du jour,” claiming that government interventions in the financial system in response 
to systemic risk concerns “occur far more regularly than an honest definition of that phrase 
would require. Indeed, systemic risk has become the rallying cry of those who patrol the 
corridors of Washington, D.C., hats in hand, looking for a handout.” BARRY RITHOLTZ & 
AARON TASK, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL 
STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 5 (2009). 
 102. Eppel, supra note 93, at 689 (quoting Jón Daníelsson, The Emperor Has No Clothes: 
Limits to Risk Modelling 18 (London Sch. of Econ., Working Paper, 2001), available at http:// 
www.sedlabanki.is/uploads/files/Malstofa_050301-JD.pdf). Even so, institutional failures such as 
LTCM and AIG were thought to be potential trigger events capable of causing systemic failure; 
in both cases, the government intervened to forestall systemic failure. 
 103. But see infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 104. For example, recently, systemic failure concerns prompted a round of government 
bailouts. Post hoc bailouts are criticized for increasing moral hazard in the markets, especially in 
firms that are “too big to fail.” David Lawder, U.S. Bailout Program Increased Moral 
Hazard: Watchdog, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/ 
idUSTRE59K0UQ20091021 (quoting OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCTOBER 21, 
2009, at 3, available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October2009_Quarterly_ 
Report_to_Congress.pdf); see also RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 101, at 5 (“Perhaps what the 
government should be doing is acting to prevent systemic risk before it threatens to destabilize 
the world’s economy, rather than merely cleaning up and bailing out afterward.”). 
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insufficient measures to prevent systemic failure.F105F The motivation of 
market participants “is to protect themselves but not the system as a 
whole. Every firm has an incentive to restrain its risk taking in order 
to protect its capital . . . . No firm, however, has an incentive to limit 
its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of contagion for other 
firms.”F106F Given this incentive structure, systemic risk can be 
conceptualized as a tragedy of the commons because “the benefits of 
exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market 
participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the 
resource, whereas the costs of exploitation . . . are distributed among 
an even wider class of persons.”F107F Protective measures taken by 
individual market participants will combat aspects of systemic risk,F108F 
but self-imposed regulation, without more, will not address the full 
range of problems posed by systemic risk. 
Systemic failure would not only harm market participants but 
would also result in externalities negatively affecting the larger 
economy and society as a whole.F109F The former president of the 
Federal Reserve, Timothy Geithner (who became the Secretary of 
the Treasury in 2009), voiced this concern in 2008 when he testified 
before the Senate that 
  [t]he most important risk is systemic. . . . [Systemic risk] is not 
theoretical risk, and it is not something that the market can solve on 
its own. It carries the risk of significant damage to economic activity. 
Absent a forceful policy response, the consequences would be lower 
incomes for working families, higher borrowing costs for housing, 
education, and the expenses of everyday life, lower value of 
retirement savings, and rising unemployment.F110 
 
 105. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 205–06 (discussing systemic risk as a tragedy of the 
commons); cf. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) 
(defining and describing the tragedy of the commons). 
 106. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 31. 
 107. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 206. 
 108. See id. at 231–34 (discussing ways in which the market regulates itself with varying 
degrees of success). 
 109. See id. at 207 (“Failure of the financial system can generate social costs in the form of 
widespread poverty and unemployment, which in turn can destroy lives and foster crime. . . . 
Protecting health and safety therefore should be additional goals of regulating systemic risk.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 110. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial 
Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 4 
(2008) (statement of Timothy Geithner, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.), 
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/OpgStmtGeithner4308Testimony.pdf. 
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Market participants would not be willing to internalize these 
societal costs,F111F and thus, in the absence of regulation, would exercise 
an insufficient degree of care to prevent systemic failure. 
B.  Systemic Risk Regulation 
Even before the events of 2008, “[g]overnments and 
international organizations [were] calling for increased regulation of 
systemic risk.”F112F Although events in the last two decades have 
intensified the call for increased regulation,F113F controlling systemic 
risk is not a new item on the legislative agenda. 
Historical attempts to regulate systemic risk focused on the most 
important source of capital and thus the natural target for regulation: 
the banking system.F114F But, given that firms increasingly have more 
access to “capital-market funding without going through banks or 
other intermediary institutions,”F115F modern systemic risk models also 
consider nonbank financial institutions and market failures.F116F The 
dynamics of systemic risk remain similar in both the banking system 
model and the more diffuse modern model. In both models, trigger 
events cause institutional failures, and the consequences travel 
“through linkages in a chain of relationships,” leading to even more 
institutional and market failures.F117F In the banking system, “the 
linkages are interbank borrowings and the interbank clearing system 
 
 111. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 206. 
 112. Id. at 194. Professor Schwarcz lists several government and nongovernment entities 
that displayed concern about the problem of systemic risk. Id. at 194–96. 
 113. The 1998 collapse of LTCM spurred a flurry of government activity concerned with 
reducing systemic risk. See Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Markets Contracts and BAPCA, 79 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 698 (2005) (“The financial markets amendments found in [the 2005 
amendment of the Bankruptcy Code] . . . can be traced back to the near failure of [LTCM].”); 
Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 211 (“After the near failure of LTCM, several U.S. government 
agencies have attempted to study how to mitigate systemic risk . . . .”). 
 114. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 198–211 (examining systemic risk in the context of 
banks and other financial institutions and listing regulations imposed on the banking system 
designed to control systemic risk, including federal insurance of bank deposits and mandatory 
minimum capital requirements). 
 115. Id. at 248; see also id. at 200 (“Companies today are able to obtain most of their 
financing through the capital markets without the use of intermediaries.”); Turmoil in U.S. 
Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial Regulators, supra note 110, at 
7 (“Over the past thirty years, we have moved from a bank-dominated financial system to a 
system in which credit is increasingly extended, securitized and actively traded in a combination 
of centralized and decentralized markets.”). 
 116. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 213. 
 117. Id. at 201. 
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for payments.”F118F In the modern systemic risk model, negative 
consequences “spread through capital-market linkages, rather than 
merely through banking relationships.”F119 
In accordance with the modern conception of systemic risk, one 
regulatory approach focuses on the linkages through which a trigger 
event can affect the market. As noted in the discussion of the LTCM 
crisis,F120F derivatives contracts are one linkage through which the 
repercussions of a firm’s failure may reach other market participants, 
creating the possibility that an individual institution’s failure may 
cause a systemic failure.F121 
Even though it is understood that the use of derivatives can 
exacerbate systemic risk, derivatives have historically enjoyed a light 
regulatory regime (relative to securities and other financial 
instruments). This lack of regulation has allowed derivatives markets 
to prosper. In light of the growth that derivative markets have 
experienced and their integral role in modern risk management, 
Congress has chosen to address derivative regulation by deploying 
what could charitably be described as indirect legislative solutions. Of 
these solutions, this Note is primarily concerned with the series of 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that created the Safe Harbor 
and thereby exempted derivatives from bankruptcy proceedings.F122 
III.  DERIVATIVES REGULATION 
This Note focuses on the regulation of derivatives in the context 
of bankruptcy proceedings. In an attempt to give an accurate 
portrayal of the federal regulation of derivatives, this Part begins with 
a brief discussion of the history of derivatives regulation and the 
modern regulatory framework. The remainder of this Part discusses 
several concerns unique to derivatives in the bankruptcy context and 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 200. 
 120. See supra Part II. 
 121. See Eppel, supra note 93, at 689 (“Systemic risk is the risk most frequently associated 
with derivatives in press reports and congressional testimony attempting to arouse public 
concern about the dangers of these financial products.”). 
 122. The first of these amendments was passed in 1982 and the latest in 2005. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 109-31(I) at 3, 20, 131–32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89, 105–06, 190–91 
(justifying the 2005 amendments as “provisions designed to reduce systemic risk”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84 (listing as a goal minimizing 
the “potentially massive losses and chain reactions that could occur if the market were to move 
sharply in the wrong direction”). 
FAUBUS IN FINAL 12/15/2009  11:44:03 AM 
2010] NARROWING THE SAFE HARBOR  821 
the de facto exemption of derivatives from normal bankruptcy 
proceedings—one approach taken by Congress to address the 
systemic risk problems posed by derivatives.  
A.  A Brief Sketch of Derivatives Regulation 
The federal regulatory regime governing derivatives is the 
product of a long and convoluted history that began as early as 
1864.F123F And although this history makes for an interesting read,F124F it 
says little about the body of federal law governing derivatives. It will 
suffice to note that, after passing the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936 (CEA),F125F which provided for federal regulation of all 
commodities and futures trading activities and required all futures 
contracts to be traded on a “contract market” (such as the Chicago 
Board of Trade),F126F Congress acted in 1974 to cure uncertainties about 
the legal status of newer forms of derivatives (which fell outside of 
the categories of derivatives expressly covered by the CEA) with the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act.F127F This act created the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), an oversight 
commission for the futures markets that is in some ways analogous to 
the SEC.F128F A quarter of a century later, Congress passed the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA),F129F which is 
the source of most modern derivatives regulation. 
Congress enacted the CFMA, among other reasons, “to promote 
innovation for . . . derivatives and to reduce systemic risk by 
 
 123. The earliest attempts to regulate derivatives failed: the Anti-Gold Futures Act of 1864 
was repealed by Congress two weeks after its enactment and the Future Trading Act of 1921 
was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court only one year later in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 
44 (1922). JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS 
REGULATION 7, 13 (1987). 
 124. See generally MARKHAM, supra note 123 (examining the impact of regulation on the 
development and growth of the commodity futures trading market). The modern regulatory 
structure began with the Grain Futures Act of 1921 (GFA), which regulated grain futures 
contracts traded on exchanges. See Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 (1923) (upholding the 
validity of the GFA). The GFA was subsequently replaced by the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936 (CEA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27 (2006). 
 125. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27 (2006). 
 126. Id. § 6; MARKHAM, supra note 123, at 13. 
 127. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 
1389; see also Lynch, supra note 45, at 1377 (describing the passage of the act). 
 128. Congress delegated power to both the SEC and the CFTC to regulate their respective 
financial instruments. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1379. 
 129. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 
Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
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enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain . . . derivatives 
transactions[, and] to reduce systemic risk and provide greater 
stability to markets during times of market disorder.”F130F These 
principles indicate that Congress sought to create a regulatory 
framework that addresses the dangers of systemic risk without stifling 
the innovation in derivatives markets with excessive regulation. 
The regulatory regime established by the CFMA treats OTC and 
exchange-traded derivatives very differently. Whereas exchange-
traded derivatives are generally subject to regulation under both the 
CEA and the CFMA, OTC derivatives have enjoyed an almost 
complete lack of regulation for as long as they have been used.F131F 
OTC derivatives owe their lack of regulation to the failure of early 
regulatory efforts to anticipate the development of an OTC market 
for derivatives.F132F This lack of regulation allowed the OTC market to 
develop—and flourish—with little government oversight, laying the 
groundwork for the popular belief that the OTC derivatives market 
flourished precisely because it lacked regulation.F133 
This belief is well founded: the OTC derivatives market has 
demonstrated that it has the capacity to address problems through 
self-regulation and market initiatives.F134F The self-sufficiency of the 
OTC market helps to explain why it has historically escaped federal 
regulation. 
B.  Derivatives in Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Congress’s general reluctance to encumber the OTC derivatives 
market is exemplified by the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of OTC 
derivatives. Under the series of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code 
that make up the Safe Harbor,F135F OTC derivatives are generally 
exempt from bankruptcy safeguards. Even after the debtor initiates 
bankruptcy proceedings, the Safe Harbor allows the nondebtor 
derivative counterparty to terminate derivatives contracts and seize 
 
 130. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 131. Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of 
Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1994). 
 132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 1380–83 (tying the explosion in OTC derivatives to a 
general lack of regulation). 
 134. See generally id. (describing the OTC derivatives industry’s effort to self-regulate). For 
a discussion of the market’s response to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, see infra 
Part IV.C. 
 135. For a discussion of the Safe Harbor, see infra Part III.B.2. 
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collateral from the debtor’s assets.F136F No other financial instrument 
receives such preferential treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.F137F 
The purpose of these favorable amendments, according to the 
legislative history, is to regulate systemic risk.F138F But understanding 
how Congress intends this treatment to reduce systemic risk requires 
understanding the basic mechanics of bankruptcy proceedings. 
1. Bankruptcy Proceedings Generally.  Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which governs bankruptcy proceedings in which 
the debtor plans to reorganize and continue its business,F139F “is 
intended to permit the debtor to rehabilitate itself while 
simultaneously protecting creditors.”F140F The “central idea” of Chapter 
11 reorganizations is to preserve going-concern surplus.F141F Going-
concern surplus, which is “the value a firm has above and beyond the 
liquidation value of its discrete assets,”F142F only exists 
if the firm’s assets are worth more to the firm than to outsiders. This 
asymmetry arises when assets are customized to meet a firm’s 
idiosyncratic needs or the needs of firms in the same industry . . . . 
These specialized assets cannot be readily redeployed by other firms 
(if the assets are firm specific) or by firms outside the industry (if 
they are industry specific).F143 
A bankruptcy filing creates an estate consisting of “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case,”F144F and, more importantly, imposes an automatic stay on 
creditors.F145F The stay prohibits creditors from taking “any act to 
obtain possession of property of the [bankruptcy] estate . . . or to 
 
 136. See supra note 23. 
 137. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 91. 
 138. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 3, 20, 131–32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89, 
105–06, 190–91 (justifying the 2005 amendments as “provisions designed to reduce systemic 
risk”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84 (invoking 
systemic risk to justify the initial exemption for derivatives from automatic stay). 
 139. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74 (2006). 
 140. In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 141. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
751, 754 (2002). The preservation of going-concern surplus is central to Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
law because it encourages ex ante investment in firms and maximizes creditor recovery ex post. 
Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 108 n.69. 
 142. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 754. 
 143. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 111. 
 144. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006). 
 145. Id. § 362(a). 
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exercise control over property of the estate.”F146F Because it freezes the 
debtor’s assets and thwarts otherwise valid claims to these assets, the 
automatic stay is perhaps the most powerful effect of a bankruptcy 
filing. 
The bankruptcy estate includes both physical assets and the 
debtor’s interest in executory contracts.F147F Executory contracts are 
agreements in which “the obligations of both the bankrupt and the 
other party to the contract are ‘so far unperformed that failure of 
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach 
excusing the performance of the other.’”F148F Accordingly, the 
automatic stay generally prohibits creditors from terminating 
executory contracts for any reason.F149F Additionally, the automatic stay 
provision nullifies so-called ipso facto contractual clauses,F150F or clauses 
that “specif[y] the consequences of a party’s bankruptcy.”F151F Typically, 
an ipso facto clause specifies that a bankruptcy filing will result in an 
automatic “default and a termination payment.”F152 
The Bankruptcy Code also gives the debtor power, “subject to 
the court’s approval, [to] assume or reject any executory contract” 
impacted by the automatic stay.F153F The purpose of this provision is to 
help the financially distressed debtor maximize the value of its assets 
by allowing it to assume beneficial contracts and reject unattractive 
contracts. This practice, known as cherrypicking, is undesirable for 
creditors holding executory contracts with the debtor but is crucial to 
the rehabilitative function of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
2. The Safe Harbor.  Even though derivatives are typically 
executory contracts,F154F the Safe Harbor gives counterparties limited 
 
 146. Id. § 362(a)(3). 
 147. In re Carroll, 903 F.2d 1266, 1270–71 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 148. In re Gov’t Sec. Corp., 111 B.R. 1007, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting Vern 
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)). 
While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory contract,” the legislative history of 
§ 365 states that an executory contract is a contract in which performance remains due on both 
sides. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303. 
 149. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (detailing comprehensive limits on a creditors’ ability to collect). 
 150. Id. § 365(e). 
 151. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (8th ed. 2004). 
 152. See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 153. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
 154. Guinn & Harvey, supra note 33, at 1137; see also Debtor’s Motion Pursuant to Sections 
105(a), 362 and 365 of the Bankr. Code to Compel Performance of Metavante Corp.’s 
Obligations Under an Executory Contract and to Enforce the Automatic Stay at 7, In re 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 2009 WL 1569988 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009) (Trial 
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power to enforce ipso facto clauses in certain derivatives contracts 
(including CDSs).F155F Because ipso facto termination clauses are 
standard provisions in derivatives contracts, the Safe Harbor 
provisions effectively exempt derivatives contracts from the 
automatic stay and, consequently, the possibility of cherrypicking. 
The Safe Harbor is only available, however, “to the extent that 
[counterparties] seek to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate their 
contracts with the Debtors, or offset or net out their positions.”F156F  
The legislative history of the Safe Harbor indicates that this 
special treatment of derivatives is aimed at reducing systemic risk by 
maintaining liquidity in the market in the event of default.F157F The Safe 
Harbor maintains market liquidity because it permits counterparties 
to terminate their contracts, unfreezing the previously illiquid assets 
and freeing the counterparties to deploy the assets elsewhere in the 
market.F158F By allowing counterparties to terminate their relationship 
with the debtor, the Safe Harbor “minimizes the potentially massive 
losses [to counterparties] and chain reactions that could occur if the 
market were to move sharply in the wrong direction.”F159F Without the 
Safe Harbor, when the debtor counterparty filed for bankruptcy the 
automatic stay would freeze the contractual relationship between the 
counterparties, leaving the nondebtor counterparty exposed to 
market movements affecting the value of the contract. 
The effects of the Safe Harbor are not completely salutary. For 
example, the Safe Harbor opens the door to the threat that a run on 
 
Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) [hereinafter Debtor’s Motion] (arguing that “[t]he 
[derivative contract at issue] is an executory contract because material performance—i.e., 
payment obligations—remains due by both [parties]”). 
 155. See supra note 23. The Safe Harbor has been described as “a narrow exception to the 
general rule that ipso facto clauses are void.” Debtor’s Motion, supra note 154, at 11. 
 156. Debtor’s Motion, supra note 154, at 11 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 560). For example, when 
faced with a counterparty that refused to pay money owed to the debtor under a swap 
agreement, the debtor argued that “withholding performance . . . is not permitted under the 
plain terms of the Safe Harbor Provisions.” Id. 
 157. COLLIERS BANKRUPTCY CODE: PART 1, at 904 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 2008) (explaining that the purpose of these provisions is to “ensure that nothing interferes 
with the prompt liquidation of a debtor’s positions, due to the fear that the insolvency of one 
party could trigger a chain reaction of insolvencies among others who carry accounts for that 
party, which might compromise the integrity of the securities markets”). 
 158. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 40 (“The 
ability to terminate financial contracts upon a counterparty’s insolvency . . . . permits the solvent 
parties to replace terminated contracts without incurring additional market risk and thereby 
preserves liquidity.”). 
 159. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84. 
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the debtor will cause an even greater liquidity shortage with “the 
potential to spill over to other firms and markets,” leading to 
widespread instability.F160F In addition, the Safe Harbor gives 
counterparties the freedom to engage in opportunistic behavior that 
can further destabilize the distressed firm and thereby increase the 
risk of failure. Thus, the Safe Harbor gives rise to both costs and 
benefits. The question, then, is whether the salutary effects of the 
Safe Harbor outweigh its costs. 
IV.  EVALUATING THE SAFE HARBOR 
This Note argues that the Safe Harbor likely produces costs in 
excess of its benefits and thus does not optimally reduce systemic risk. 
To be sure, the Safe Harbor combats systemic risk by facilitating 
speedy settlement of derivatives contracts and thereby maintains 
liquidity in troubled markets.F161F But the Safe Harbor is also a source 
of systemic risk because it allows derivatives counterparties to run on 
the assets of a distressed firm. A run or “grab race” (this Note uses 
the terms interchangeably) occurs when counterparties race to seize 
collateral from the distressed firm’s assets; this can result in less 
efficient distribution of those assets than would otherwise occur 
under bankruptcy proceedings, or even in the event of the firm’s 
failure. In both cases, the costs created by the run are borne by some 
of the distressed firm’s creditors.F162F These costs, in the aggregate, may 
lead to systemic consequences that ultimately eclipse the benefit of 
the liquidity provided by the Safe Harbor. 
In order to illustrate the complex effects of the Safe Harbor, this 
Part examines two case studies: the collapse of LTCM and the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Lehman). The events that 
transpired in the LTCM scenario demonstrate how the Safe Harbor 
opens the door to an alternative type of systemic risk that arises when 
 
 160. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 105–06. 
 161. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 40 (“The ability 
to terminate financial contracts upon a counterparty’s insolvency enhances market stability. . . . 
[by] limit[ing] losses to solvent counterparties and . . . . permit[ting] the solvent parties to 
replace terminated contracts without incurring additional market risk and thereby preserv[ing] 
liquidity.”). 
 162. See Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of 
Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399, 402 (1986) (“Creditors 
will attempt to grab assets away from the debtor before others can reach them. This can make a 
bad situation worse, for it can destroy any going-concern value that might otherwise exist if the 
creditors would cooperate and leave the assets in place.”). 
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counterparties run on a distressed firm’s assets. The events of the 
Lehman bankruptcy demonstrate that even though the Safe Harbor 
may lead to harmful behavior by a distressed firm’s counterparties, it 
can help stabilize a troubled market. And although these two cases 
ultimately provide equivocal evidence as to the effectiveness of the 
Safe Harbor, they show that the Safe Harbor is in need of repair. 
A.  The Costs of the Safe Harbor: The Grab Race and 
Opportunistic Behavior 
The Safe Harbor creates costs by allowing counterparties to run 
on a distressed firm’s assets and engage in opportunistic behavior that 
may further harm the distressed firm. This Section looks at each cost 
in turn. 
1. The Grab Race.  By allowing derivatives counterparties to 
circumvent the automatic stay and exercise their claims against a 
financially distressed firm,F163F the Safe Harbor allows creditors to run 
on a distressed firm in a grab race for the firm’s assets.F164F The 
mechanics of a run by CDS counterparties under the Safe Harbor are 
as follows: a counterparty is free to invoke an ipso facto clause in a 
CDS contract with a distressed firm (generally if that firm files for 
bankruptcy). This extends to both protection buyers and sellers; 
either party may terminate the contract and claim what it is owed. As 
a general rule, however, the protection seller will have only a small 
claim (or no claim at all) against the protection buyer’s assets. This is 
true because the protection buyer pays as a premium either a single 
upfront payment or a series of periodic payments.F165F In contrast, the 
protection seller’s potential liability under the contract is tied to the 
performance of the reference subject. If, at the time of bankruptcy, 
the distressed protection seller owes money to the protection buyer 
(this is known as an “in the money” contract),F166F the protection buyer 
will invoke the ipso facto clause and terminate the contract; 
subsequently, the protection buyer will act to secure its collateral. The 
act of seizing collateral from the distressed protection seller’s 
 
 163. See supra note 136. 
 164. See supra note 162. 
 165. Kayle, supra note 58, at 224. 
 166. Stephen R. Kruft, Cross-Default Provisions in Financing and Derivatives Transactions, 
113 BANKING L.J. 216, 231 n.24 (1996) (“In the typical derivative . . . a party may at any time be 
‘in the money,’ meaning that it is entitled to a payment from its counterparty, or ‘out of the 
money,’ meaning that it will be required to pay its counterparty.”). 
FAUBUS IN FINAL 12/15/2009  11:44:03 AM 
828 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:801 
remaining assets is rational from an individual protection buyer’s 
perspective, but when multiple protection buyers each act to secure 
their portion of the protection seller’s limited resources, the resulting 
grab race can lead to an inefficient distribution of the protection 
seller’s remaining assets, draining the firm’s value.F167 
The grab race occurs exactly like it sounds: creditors race to be 
the first to grab assets to satisfy their claims on the distressed firm.F168F 
The race analogy is apt; the assets of a financially distressed firm are 
“analogous to a scarce resource (e.g., fish in a lake) to which users 
have unlimited, nonexclusive rights of access.”F169F Without “regulation 
or the creation of exclusive property rights,” users will quickly 
deplete the resource.F170F The first users “to exploit the resource will be 
satisfied, the last will not; therefore, every user rushes to consume the 
resource first. This will be true even if the resource would have more 
value per user if exploited in a more restrained fashion.”F171 
Bankruptcy law imposes the automatic stay to avoid a grab race, 
allowing bankruptcy courts to distribute the resources of the debtor 
firm in a restrained fashion that preserves the debtor’s going-concern 
surplus value.F172F The traditional view of the automatic stay is that its 
purpose is to maximize the value of the debtor firm for reorganization 
or sale to satisfy all creditors by “shielding the debtor’s assets and 
preventing a race that rewards the first creditor to the 
courthouse[] . . . and facilitat[ing] a collective proceeding in which the 
parties (debtor and creditors) can negotiate the terms under which 
the firm will continue.”F173F In other words, the automatic stay restrains 
creditors not only to preserve the resources of the debtor firm but 
also to ensure that resources are distributed to creditors in an 
 
 167. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a 
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 781 (2004) (stating that a 
grab race can “destroy value by, for instance, forcing the piecemeal liquidation of assets that 
would be worth more as a going concern”). 
 168. Id. at 781 (“[C]reditors may try to sidestep the collective proceeding, and engage in a 
‘race to the courthouse’ . . . to get their money back before anyone else gets paid.”). 
 169. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 106 (citing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC 
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10–13 (1986)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 167, at 781 (“U.S. bankruptcy law addresses the ‘grab 
race’ concern by providing for an ‘automatic stay’ of creditors’ collection activities.”). 
 173. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 95. 
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efficient and equitable fashion.F174F In this way, bankruptcy law avoids 
the unnecessary costs that a grab race would otherwise impose on 
both the debtor and slower creditors. 
In the absence of bankruptcy protections, the grab race can have 
a powerful destabilizing effect on the debtor firm by “destroy[ing] any 
going-concern value that might otherwise exist if the creditors would 
cooperate and leave the assets in place.”F175F Moreover, the distressed 
firm’s slower creditors will be unable to satisfy their claims and 
thereby will be harmed by the grab race. 
The grab race does, however, have at least one positive aspect: it 
allows for a speedy distribution of the debtor’s assets. Bankruptcy 
proceedings take time, and for the duration of the proceedings the 
ultimate values of the claims of many creditors may be uncertain. 
Thus, without regard for whether their claims are ultimately fulfilled, 
creditors benefit from an increase in the speed of the settlement of 
their claims against the debtor. Markets also benefit when creditors 
resolve uncertainties regarding their exposure to market movements 
or distressed firms. These positive values—speed and certainty—must 
be weighed against the costs of the grab race in order to clarify 
whether the ultimate value of the Safe Harbor is positive or negative. 
2. Opportunistic Behavior.  By exempting derivatives from the 
automatic stay, the Safe Harbor amplifies the power asymmetry 
inherent in bankruptcy proceedings. One way in which the automatic 
stay maximizes the financially distressed debtor’s rehabilitative 
chances is by placing it in a position to bargain with its creditors. But 
when the stay does not apply, the debtor has little bargaining power 
and creditors are free to act opportunistically. Take a typical CDS 
transaction as an example: a counterparty is free to invoke an ipso 
facto clause and terminate a contract upon bankruptcy, and assuming 
that the contract is in-the-money (or very nearly so), a protection 
seller is more likely to terminate if the price of the contract has gone 
up.F176F In the case of a CDS contract, price would increase along with 
an increased risk of default on the part of the reference entity. For 
example, if a CDS references the bonds of an issuer whose credit 
 
 174. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, the claims of creditors may have different priorities 
depending on the substance of their claims against the debtor. Generally speaking, the claims of 
secured creditors have priority over unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) 
(2006). The claims of unsecured creditors are prioritized in accordance with the nine-level 
hierarchy established in Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 507. 
 175. Jackson, supra note 162, at 402. 
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rating is downgraded, then the price of the CDS will increase.F177F In 
such a case, if the protection seller terminates the derivative contract, 
the debtor will be exposed to a more risky reference subject and it 
will be more expensive for the debtor to secure a replacement 
hedge.F178 
Moreover, if there is a downside to the derivative contract, it is 
assured to go to the debtor.F179F To illustrate, assume that the debtor 
has purchased a CDS protecting it against a credit downgrade of one 
or more of several auto manufacturers that are its major clients. If, at 
the time of bankruptcy, one or more of the auto manufacturers is at 
an increased risk of default (relative to when the CDS was issued), 
then the CDS is a valuable asset. In this scenario, the nondebtor 
protection seller will terminate either because it no longer wishes to 
sell protection on the auto manufacturer given its increased risk of 
default or because it wishes to reissue the contract to another party at 
a higher price. If at the time of bankruptcy, however, the auto 
manufacturers are not at an increased risk of default, then the 
protection seller will likely not terminate the CDS,F180F but (possibly) 
retains the option to do so unilaterally.F181F Thus, the Safe Harbor shifts 
costs onto distressed firms,F182F costs that could potentially increase the 
likelihood of failure. And if the firm is large enough, such failure may 
have systemic risk implications. 
 
 176. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050 (explaining that counterparties may have 
an incentive to terminate a derivative strategically). 
 177. See id. (explaining that a CDS is more valuable when “the likelihood of issuer default 
or downgrade has increased”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1542 (2005) 
(“[O]nly the non-debtor counterparty obtains the upside of a derivative in a bankruptcy, not the 
debtor.”). 
 180. This illustration is cobbled together from hypotheticals in Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 
10, at 1050, and Vasser, supra note 179, at 1542. 
 181. It is unclear how long the nondebtor may wait without taking action under the Safe 
Harbor before the nondebtor’s right to terminate the contract is waived. In In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings Inc., Nos. 08-13555 (JMP) and 08-13900 (JMP), 2009 WL 3088795 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2009), the debtor argued for the court to invalidate a provision in the standard contract 
governing derivative agreements permitting the nondefaulting party to suspend payment 
otherwise owed under the contract while an event of default was ongoing. Debtor’s Motion, 
supra note 154, at 6, 10–11. The debtor argued that a counterparty who refuses to make 
payments under their contract and does not attempt to “liquidate, terminate, or accelerate their 
contract” in accordance with the Safe Harbor is “withholding performance[, which] . . . is not 
permitted under the plain terms of the Safe Harbor Provisions.” Id. at 11 
 182. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050 (“[Strategic] terminat[ion] mak[es] it much 
more expensive for the debtor to enter a new hedging contract.”). 
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B.  Revisiting LTCM: When the Safe Harbor Hurts 
More Than It Helps 
The possible systemic consequences of a run on a distressed firm 
under the Safe Harbor are best illustrated by the facts surrounding 
the near failure of LTCM.F183F When it became apparent that LTCM 
was on the brink of filing for bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York intervened to bail out the distressed hedge fund. The 
president of the Federal Reserve, William McDonough, explained 
that the action was necessary because the “abrupt and disorderly 
closeout of [LTCM]’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the 
American economy.”F184F McDonough elaborated that this scenario 
presented the “likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate 
markets would experience extreme price moves and probably cease 
to function . . . . This would have caused a vicious cycle. A loss of 
investor confidence . . . leading to further liquidation of positions, and 
so on.”F185F Essentially, McDonough described the possibility of a 
systemic failure resulting from the rush of LTCM’s counterparties to 
simultaneously liquidate “hundreds of billions of dollars of 
derivatives contracts.”F186 
The Federal Reserve intervened to avoid the probable systemic 
consequences of counterparties terminating derivatives contracts 
under the Safe Harbor and seizing collateral from LTCM’s assets.F187F 
Had the Federal Reserve not intervened, and had LTCM filed for 
bankruptcy, the resulting run on LTCM’s assets would likely have 
had systemic consequences “adversely affect[ing] many market 
participants with no connection to LTCM.”F188F Those creditors who 
arrived first would have received collateral, quickly depleting the 
assets of the firm and leaving nothing for latecomers. This, in turn, 
would have rendered other creditors unable to meet their own 
obligations. In addition, the confusion of multiple counterparties 
simultaneously terminating their outstanding derivatives contracts 
 
 183. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 201 (endorsing the view that the rush of counterparties 
to close out derivatives contracts would have had systemic consequences). But see Edwards & 
Morrison, supra note 27, at 103–06 (rationalizing the role of the Safe Harbor provisions in the 
LTCM crisis by invoking their lack of a role in the Enron failure, which posed no systemic 
threat despite similar circumstances). 
 184. Hedge Fund Operations, supra note 95, at 19. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 100. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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with LTCM would have further reduced trading in the affected 
markets. The rush of counterparties closing out derivatives contracts 
with LTCM “would have resulted in tremendous uncertainty about 
how far prices might move,” and most market participants would be 
unwilling to trade in such volatile conditions.F189 
C.  Lehman Brothers: The Safe Harbor Doing Its Job 
The outcome of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy illustrates that 
the Safe Harbor helps to calm troubled markets despite having the 
potential to harm the distressed firm. On the one hand, the Safe 
Harbor enabled the OTC derivatives market to respond swiftly and 
effectively to Lehman’s bankruptcy with a series of initiatives that 
resolved much of the uncertainty in the $57.3 trillion CDS market.F190F 
On the other hand, the Safe Harbor enabled counterparties with 
Lehman to engage in opportunistic behavior that harmed the firm 
and its creditors. On the whole, however, it appears that in Lehman’s 
case the Safe Harbor did more good than harm. 
As of this Note’s publication, Lehman’s bankruptcy filing is the 
biggest in history.F191F This event left financial markets across the globe 
“in cryogenesis” as market participants struggled to sort out the 
uncertainties caused by Lehman’s filing.F192F This was no small task in 
the CDS market, in which Lehman played a “central role” as both a 
counterparty and a reference entity.F193F Lehman’s bankruptcy triggered 
ipso facto clauses in “CDS contracts referencing Lehman, 
and . . . terminate[d] the contracts that the firm had entered into as a 
counterparty.”F194F To complicate matters, there was no reliable public 
information about the “volume of CDS contracts referencing Lehman 
or the net amounts required to settle them . . . . The absence of such 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Ingo Fender, Allen Frankel & Jacob Gyntelberg, Box 1: Three Market Implications of 
the Lehman Bankruptcy, in Ingo Fender & Jacob Gyntelberg, Overview: Global Financial Crisis 
Spurs Unprecedented Policy Actions, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2008, at 6, 6, available at http://www.bis. 
org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812x.htm. 
 191. Jonathan D. Glater & Gretchen Morgenson, Firm’s Creditors, Large and Small, 
Compete for a Piece of What’s Left, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C8 (“Lehman lists total assets 
of $639 billion—more than the gross domestic product of Argentina and roughly 10 times the 
size of Enron when it filed for bankruptcy in 2001.”). 
 192. Bo Peng, Lehman CDS Net Settlement Only $6B: What Does It Mean?, SEEKING 
ALPHA, Oct. 13, 2008, http://seekingalpha.com/article/99654-lehman-cds-net-settlement-only-
6b-what-does-it-mean. 
 193. Fender et al., supra note 190, at 6. 
 194. Id. 
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information created great uncertainty about the capacity of already 
strained money markets to accommodate the anticipated 
corresponding liquidity needs.”F195 
Leaders in the OTC derivatives market joined together to repair 
the damage wrought by Lehman’s bankruptcy.F196F The result of their 
efforts was a net settlement payment of $5.2 billion from sellers of 
CDS protection on Lehman to their counterparties.F197F The exchange 
of this relatively small sum had “no noticeable impact on liquidity 
conditions at the time of settlement,”F198F but the settlement did ease 
some of the uncertainties that likely contributed to the volatility of 
capital markets following the bankruptcy filing.F199 
Even as the Safe Harbor provided the means for market 
participants to mend the OTC market, it also gave some 
counterparties the means to evade their liabilities to Lehman. In 
accordance with the Safe Harbor, counterparties to which Lehman 
owed money were “terminating their contracts with 
Lehman . . . . [and] trying to close [their derivatives] positions and 
come up with [settlement] values.”F200F But as predicted, 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. First, an “extraordinary trading session” was organized just before the bankruptcy 
filing to help major derivatives dealers net counterparty positions involving Lehman and 
“enter[] into transactions with other participants that . . . fully or partially offset OTC 
derivatives positions that they have with Lehman.” Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives 
Ass’n, Lehman Risk Reduction Trading Session and Protocol Agreement (Sept. 14, 2008), 
available at http://www.isda.org/press/press091408lehman.html. Second, an auction was 
conducted among CDS dealers to determine the price of Lehman’s bonds, which established the 
amount that CDS sellers would have to pay their counterparties. Mary Williams Walsh, 
Insurance on Lehman Debt Is the Industry’s Next Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at B1. Finally, 
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, which provides clearance, settlement, and 
information services for over-the-counter derivatives, closed out $72 billion in CDS contracts 
referencing Lehman. Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., DTCC Successfully 
Closes Out Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.dtcc.com/ 
news/press/releases/2008/dtcc_closes_lehman_cds.php. 
 197. Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., supra note 196. 
 198. Fender et al., supra note 190, at 7. 
 199. Id. Still, the settlement left banks and other credit providers uncertain about the 
potential liabilities of trading partners: “Banks know how much they’re liable for. But they 
don’t know how much others are [liable for], including their hedge fund clients.” Peng, supra 
note 192. 
 200. Glater & Morgenson, supra note 191 (quoting Robert G. Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps & 
Derivatives Ass’n). About 85 percent of Lehman’s trading partners terminated their derivatives 
contracts, and “roughly 800 counterparties, mostly small players facing hefty terminations fees, 
opted to leave about 6,000 Lehman trades outstanding.” Serena Ng & Mike Spector, The 
Specter of Lehman Shadows Trade Partners: Derivatives Pacts Remain in Limbo for 
Municipalities, Firms, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at C1. 
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contemporaneous with Lehman’s bankruptcy, some counterparties 
owing money to Lehman tried “to slip away into the night [because i]t 
is a waste of precious time for the bankruptcy trustee to have to chase 
people down.”F201F Some of Lehman’s clients “stopped paying when 
Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection, prompting a series of 
lawsuits from Lehman’s estate.”F202F As of this Note’s publication, 
Lehman has only been able to recoup from its derivatives 
counterparties “$6 billion . . . out of a targeted $12 billion.”F203F This 
money recovered from Lehman’s derivatives business is used to pay 
out on its creditors’ claims.F204 
These two cases highlight the central conflict in using the Safe 
Harbor to regulate systemic risk. On the one hand, as exemplified by 
the Federal Reserve’s rationale for bailing out LTCM, there is a risk 
that the unrestrained liquidation of derivatives contracts held by a 
large financial institution can lead to “another form of systemic risk, 
namely the risk that a ‘run’ by derivatives counterparties on the 
debtor will itself destabilize financial markets.”F205F On the other hand, 
Lehman’s bankruptcy showed that market participants can work 
together under the Safe Harbor to resolve uncertainties and stabilize 
the market. Nevertheless, Lehman’s lesson is ultimately equivocal as 
the settlement did little to enhance liquidity in the market.F206 
There are at least two complicating factors that dilute the lessons 
of these two cases. First, Lehman filed for bankruptcy whereas LTCM 
did not; the systemic dangers posed by LTCM’s bankruptcy were 
preempted by the Federal Reserve’s intervention. And second, 
because Lehman was a financial enterprise with assets consisting 
almost entirely of financial contracts, it was not a typical candidate for 
Chapter 11 reorganization.F207F This means that the Lehman bankruptcy 
 
 201. Glater & Morgenson, supra note 191 (quoting David A. Skeel, Jr., Law Professor, 
University of Pennsylvania). According to the head of Lehman’s derivatives legal team, the 
process of reconciling the derivatives is “unbelievably time-consuming.” Ng & Spector, supra 
note 201 (quoting Locke McMurray, head of Lehman’s derivatives legal team). 
 202. Ng & Spector, supra note 200. One of these cases, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., is 
discussed supra at note 181. 
 203. Ng & Spector, supra note 201. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 94. 
 206. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 40 (describing the 
liquidity benefits of the Safe Harbor provision). 
 207. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 114 (“The assets of [financial enterprises] 
consist almost entirely of financial contracts. Although much talent and energy may have been 
spent to assemble and manage its contracts, there is little or no going-concern surplus in an 
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was less concerned with rehabilitation than with the orderly 
liquidation of the firm’s assets. The negative effects of the Safe 
Harbor should be less apparent in this type of case because there is 
no rehabilitation effort for it to hinder. Any run on Lehman’s assets 
would have been unlikely to result in serious costs that could have 
been avoided through bankruptcy proceedings because, as a firm 
possessing primarily financial assets, Lehman had little going-concern 
surplus to preserve.F208 
Even though the evidence is murky, the Lehman case indicates 
that there is a danger that the Safe Harbor may not work as Congress 
intended. The liquidity benefits produced by the Safe Harbor may be 
outweighed by the corresponding losses caused by opportunistic 
behavior and, if the firm has going-concern surplus to preserve, the 
costs of the grab race. This is especially true when dealing with 
derivatives that are more valuable to the debtor than to the 
counterparty, because the liquidation of these derivatives will result 
in a net loss. The aggregate effect of these losses is a greater 
likelihood of debtor failure and the concomitant systemic 
consequences. Because the purpose of the Safe Harbor is to reduce 
systemic risk, there is little reason why it should apply to such 
derivatives. 
V.  NARROWING THE SAFE HARBOR 
The Safe Harbor would better reduce systemic risk if it did not 
apply to CDSs used to hedge against a risk to the firm’s assets or 
investments.F209F In the rehabilitative context of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
the following maxim answers the question of whether the automatic 
stay should apply to a particular asset: “if the asset is worth more in 
the hands of the debtor than it would be in the hands of a third party, 
the stay should not be lifted.”F210F Hedging CDSs—like insurance 
contracts—are likely worth more in the debtor’s hands.F211F They 
 
insolvent [financial enterprise]. If a [financial enterprise] is insolvent, it is because the value of 
its portfolio has diminished . . . .”). 
 208. Id. 
 209. For a discussion of hedging CDSs, see supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text. 
 210. JACKSON, supra note 169, at 183. 
 211. See Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs, Inc.), 5 B.R. 529, 
530 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980) (“[M]aintenance of insurance . . . is essential for the rehabilitation of 
the debtor and the protection of the creditors.”). On the other hand, the Safe Harbor should 
still apply to “naked” CDSs. In a naked CDS, the CDS holder has not purchased the CDS to 
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protect against risks to assets and investments, and, if the CDS is 
terminated, the debtor will most likely have to pay a premium to 
replace the hedge (if a replacement can be found at all). These costs 
of allowing CDSs to be terminated under the Safe Harbor increase 
the probability of debtor failure, and firm failure is a classic systemic 
risk trigger event.F212F It follows that the inclusion of hedging CDSs 
within the Safe Harbor may undermine its ultimate goal of reducing 
systemic risk. 
A.  The Case for Narrowing the Safe Harbor 
1. Hedging CDSs Are Analogous to Insurance Contracts.  In 
terms of economic substance, CDSs used to hedge a risk are very 
similar to insurance contracts.F213F Purchasers enter into a hedging CDS 
to “insure” an interest in an investment or asset against the risk that a 
change in the credit quality of the reference subject will damage that 
interest.F214F The analogy to insurance is not perfect,F215F but the 
differences between the two types of contract are largely immaterial. 
CDSs, when used to hedge against the possibility of default, “have 
payouts that are economically similar to insurance contracts.”F216 
Insurance contracts, as assets of the bankruptcy estate, are 
subject to the automatic stay, so insurers are forbidden from 
terminating an insurance policy when the policyholder files for 
 
protect against a risk to investments or assets, so the CDS is merely a bet on the default of the 
reference entity. For a discussion of naked CDSs, see supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 212. For a discussion of systemic risk trigger events, see supra notes 88–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 213. See Merrill Lynch Int’l v. XL Capital Assurance Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A credit default swap is an arrangement similar to an insurance contract.”); 
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050 (describing the similarities and differences between 
CDSs and normal insurance policies). 
 214. For example, most hedging CDSs protect a stream of income (from a bond or other 
security) against the possibility that the obligor will default or otherwise be unable to meet its 
obligations. 
 215. For a detailed discussion of the differences between CDSs and standard insurance 
policies, see Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 405, 423–24 (2007). Professor Lubben discusses, among other subjects, how the differences 
between CDSs and standard insurance contracts affect the incentive to monitor counterparties 
and implicate moral hazard issues. Id. at 423–30. 
 216. Id. at 423; see also CHOUDHRY, supra note 52, at 1 (noting that a CDS is “conceptually 
similar to an insurance policy taken out against the default of a bond”); Kayle, supra note 58, at 
224–25 (stating that a CDS “functions as a form of insurance against the risk of default” when 
the protection buyer is exposed to the reference subject). 
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bankruptcy.F217F At the policy level, the automatic stay applies to 
insurance contracts because the “maintenance of insurance . . . is 
essential for the rehabilitation of the debtor and the protection of the 
creditors.”F218F In other words, allowing the debtor to maintain 
insurance is crucial because those contracts help further the 
rehabilitative goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.F219 
The strength of the analogy between insurance contracts and 
hedging CDSs buttresses the argument for similar treatment of both. 
As with insurance contracts, a hedging CDS may be crucial to the 
debtor firm’s value.F220F It follows that the termination of an insurance-
like CDS may hinder the rehabilitation of the debtor and thereby run 
counter to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. 
2. Termination of a Hedging CDS Exposes the Debtor to Greater 
Risk.  Debtors enter into hedging CDSs to hedge particular risks, and 
this hedge disappears when a counterparty liquidates the contract.F221F 
Increased risk exposure can potentially destabilize the firm, 
increasing the risk of firm failure.F222F And even if it does not lead to 
failure, increased risk lowers the value of the debtor firm.F223F In both 
cases, the effects of terminating a hedge extend beyond the debtor to 
other creditors.F224 
Even though the termination of a CDS diminishes the debtor’s 
value, Professors Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison 
argue that the Safe Harbor rightly exempts derivatives from 
bankruptcy proceedings because the termination of a derivative 
 
 217. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050. The policy is generally treated as property of 
the estate, so its termination would violate the automatic stay. See Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. 
Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs, Inc.), 5 B.R. 529, 531 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980) (holding 
that an insurance policy “constitute[s] an asset of the bankrupt estate” and is therefore subject 
to the automatic stay). 
 218. In re Cahokia Downs, Inc., 5 B.R. at 530. 
 219. Protecting a firm’s going-concern surplus is the central aim of Chapter 11 
reorganization. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 758. 
 220. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1049–50 (expressing skepticism about the 
Safe Harbor’s presupposition that the termination of a derivative is a “no harm, no foul” 
scenario); Vasser, supra note 179, at 1542 (expressing similar skepticism). 
 221. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. (explaining that removing a hedge may harm both the debtor and its creditors 
because “a firm in bankruptcy . . . will be unable to replace a derivative contract on precisely the 
same terms” and the new high premium may cause the firm to decrease in value, damaging the 
firm’s creditors). 
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contract is unlikely to diminish the debtor’s going-concern surplus.F225F 
Going-concern surplus is the value that Chapter 11 “reorganization 
exists to preserve.”F226F Without diminution in this value, then, there is 
no harm in allowing counterparties to avoid the automatic stay.F227F 
Whereas this argument may be true for financial firms, which 
generally lack going-concern surplus because their assets primarily 
consist of fungible financial contracts,F228F it is not true for “non-
financial firms, such as manufacturing, energy supply, and 
telecommunications concerns.”F229F For these firms, increased risk 
exposure may indeed “reduc[e] the value of [the firm’s] non-financial 
assets . . . . [which] can harm the firm’s operations and its other 
creditors.” F230 
Even so, Professors Edwards and Morrison contend that the Safe 
Harbor rightly ignores the costs of termination because the costs 
imposed on the debtor (and by extension, on the other creditors) are 
“no different from the effect of an economy-wide increase in demand 
for a critical input (say, oil). Assuming a stable supply, the increase in 
demand will raise the price of fuel, thereby increasing debtor’s costs, 
reducing profits, and reducing (at least temporarily) firm value.” This 
argument posits that, just as the Bankruptcy Code is unconcerned 
with losses caused by macroeconomic events such as increases in 
demand, it should not be concerned with the negative effect of a 
counterparty’s decision to cancel a contract because, in both cases, 
“the debtor firm [is merely exposed] to the desirable discipline of 
market-based prices.”F231 
Although this argument is persuasive, it ultimately fails because 
it conflates macroeconomic events with actions that fall squarely 
within the purview of the Bankruptcy Code. The potentially harmful 
termination of contracts with a debtor is exactly the kind of behavior 
that bankruptcy law regulates.F232F The purpose of Chapter 11 is to 
 
 225. Id. at 114. 
 226. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 758. 
 227. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 116. 
 228. Id. at 114. 
 229. Id. at 115. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. For example, the automatic stay prohibits creditors from “any act to obtain possession 
of property of the [bankruptcy] estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2006). 
FAUBUS IN FINAL 12/15/2009  11:44:03 AM 
2010] NARROWING THE SAFE HARBOR  839 
balance the interests of the debtor and its creditors,F233F and it is 
generally concerned with regulating creditor-debtor relationships.F234F 
Moreover, because Congress has chosen to combat systemic risk 
through the Bankruptcy Code, the Code is explicitly concerned with 
regulating events in the bankruptcy context that may contribute to 
systemic risk.F235F If this kind of termination does in fact increase the 
systemic consequences of bankruptcy, it falls within the Code’s 
regulatory purview. 
3. Hedging CDSs Are Not Practically Fungible.  When a 
counterparty unilaterally chooses to terminate an insurance-like CDS, 
diminishing the debtor’s value, it leaves fewer assets to satisfy other 
creditors.F236F In a sense, the terminating counterparty “imposes an 
externality on other creditors.”F237F When a derivative contract is 
fungible, however, the opportunistic termination of that contract does 
not lead to an overall loss. In this case, “the harm to the debtor firm is 
generally equal to the counterparty’s gain: . . . the [debtor] loses a 
hedge . . . and the counterparty ceases providing this hedge.”F238F 
Furthermore, when derivatives contracts are “fungible, replaceable 
assets much like cash,” their termination will not affect the going-
concern surplus value of the debtor.F239F In this scenario, termination 
does not undermine the rehabilitative function of Chapter 11.F240 
But, in practice, a debtor’s hedging derivatives will rarely be 
fungible, if only because “[n]ew counterparties will charge a premium 
to deal with a distressed firm.”F241F The debtor will incur increased costs 
to replace the hedge simply because it is in bankruptcy.F242F Thus, in 
 
 233. See, e.g., In re PPI Enterps. (U.S.) Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Chapter 11 
[bankruptcy] is intended to permit the debtor to rehabilitate itself while simultaneously 
protecting creditors.”). 
 234. 11 U.S.C. § 105 grants bankruptcy courts “broad authority to modify creditor-debtor 
relationships.” United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990). 
 235. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), at 132 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 192 
(justifying the Safe Harbor as “consistent with the policy goal of minimizing systemic risk”). 
 236. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115 (noting that the loss of a hedge “can 
harm the firm’s operations and its other creditors”). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 114. 
 240. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 758 (noting that preserving going-concern 
surplus is “the thing the law of corporate reorganizations exists to preserve”). 
 241. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115. 
 242. See Karen Brettell, Lehman CDS Counterparties Begin Resetting Trades, REUTERS, 
Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/ 
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most scenarios in which the Safe Harbor applies, insurance-like CDSs 
are not practically fungible.F243F And in some cases,”[t]he [replacement] 
premium may be so high that the firm can no longer hedge certain 
risks; as a result, firm value may fall, to the detriment of all 
creditors.”F244F Termination under the Safe Harbor is not always a “no 
harm, no foul” scenario;F245F it can result in serious consequences to the 
debtor and its creditors. As such, it has systemic risk implications. 
B.  Potential Problems with Narrowing the Safe Harbor 
The task of narrowing the Safe Harbor is not without issues. 
First, it is unclear whether the reasoning behind exempting hedging 
CDSs from the Safe Harbor would necessarily extend to other 
hedging derivatives. Even if it does, there is little need to change the 
regulation of other derivatives markets without evidence that they are 
malfunctioning. Regardless of whether the reasoning behind this 
approach would apply to other derivatives, CDSs are uniquely in 
need of special treatment (as evidenced by their role in the economic 
crisis of 2008 and 2009). 
Second, the Bankruptcy Code generally avoids rules that 
differentiate between contracts “based on the subject matter of the 
transaction.”F246F As such, this proposal runs contrary to the 
Bankruptcy Code’s general disapproval of inquiry into the substance 
of derivatives contracts.F247F A narrowed Safe Harbor would almost 
necessarily rely on a court’s assessment of the substance of the 
contract, clouding the bankruptcy settlement process with uncertainty 
 
idUSN1529868020080915 (noting that, for CDSs terminated as a result of the Lehman 
bankruptcy, entering into replacement CDSs would “for some protection buyers . . . be in many 
cases significantly more expensive”). 
 243. The analogy to insurance proves useful here: if an insurance provider were able to 
terminate an insurance policy with a bankrupt policyholder, it is unlikely that the debtor would 
be able to find a replacement policy without demonstrating the ability to pay a premium to 
compensate the new provider for dealing with the risks of a firm in bankruptcy. And if the 
debtor is unable to afford the increased cost of a new policy, the firm is exposed to the risk 
against which it was previously insured. 
 244. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115. 
 245. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1049–50 (reaching a similar conclusion based on 
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior under the Safe Harbor). But see Edwards & Morrison, 
supra note 27, at 115 (reaching the opposite conclusion). 
 246. Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy 
Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 641, 663 (2005) (discussing potential problems posed by the kind of rule that 
differentiates between contracts in this way). 
 247. Id. at 664. 
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as to the rights of the counterparties.F248F As a result, the transaction 
costs of entering into a CDS would likely rise if parties sought to 
define ex ante whether the economic substance of a particular CDS 
would subject it to the automatic stay. Such a rule would also likely 
increase the cost of purchasing a CDS in order to compensate for ex 
post uncertainty. But it makes little sense for the Bankruptcy Code to 
treat derivatives as though they are all identical, especially when 
differentiating between contracts could help the Code meet its goal of 
reducing systemic risk. 
CONCLUSION 
Put simply, the case for narrowing the Safe Harbor rests on the 
premise that different contracts have different values in different 
circumstances. This Note argues that the Safe Harbor would more 
effectively reduce systemic risk if it did not exempt all CDSs from 
bankruptcy proceedings. Insurance-like CDSs are likely more 
valuable in the debtor’s hands than in the counterparty’s hands. The 
Safe Harbor ignores the possibility that such a disparity in value may 
exist, presupposing instead that, in the aggregate, the value of 
liquidity outweighs the costs inflicted by opportunistic behavior or the 
grab race for the debtor’s assets. The Safe Harbor should not ignore 
the possibility that this disparity in value exists because, if it does 
exist, the Safe Harbor may allow counterparties to unnecessarily 
damage the debtor and increase the probability that debtor firms will 
fall deeper into a liquidity crisis with the potential to affect the larger 
market. The Safe Harbor’s sanctioning of such costs is at cross-
purposes with Congress’s intent to reduce systemic risk. 
Narrowing the Safe Harbor could have widespread beneficial 
consequences. The notional value,F249F or “amount that is used to 
calculate payments made on swaps and other risk management 
products,”F250F of the CDS market was “$54.6 trillion in the first half of 
 
 248. See id. (arguing that broad definitions prevent analysis based on substance and limit the 
role of the judge to working with formal definitions). 
 249. The notional value generally overstates the true amount of the investment at stake, as 
“the notional amount does not trade hands and is not at risk.” Romano, supra note 48, at 46. 
But because the true size of the OTC market is difficult to ascertain, the best measure available 
is in terms of notional value. Id. at 4 (explaining that the difficulty in quantifying the OTC 
derivative market exists “because there is no accurate mechanism for tracking” it). 
 250. InvestorDictionary.com, Notional Amount, http://www.investordictionary.com/ 
definition/notional+amount.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
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2008.”F251F With major bankruptcy proceedings probable in the near 
future, there are huge amounts of money at stake. But even more 
importantly, the change proposed by this Note might help protect the 
American economy from systemic failure and make the financial 
system stronger going forward. 
 
 251. Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n., Summaries of Market Survey Results: 2008 Mid-
Year Market Survey, http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
